Statesman
by Plato
translated by Benjamin Jowett
Persons of the Dialogue:
THEODORUS;
SOCRATES;
The Eleatic STRANGER;
The younger SOCRATES.
[Socrates] I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the
acquaintance both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.
[Theodorus] And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me
three times as many, when they have completed for you the
delineation of the Statesman and of the Philosopher, as well as
of the Sophist.
[Soc.] Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus,
do my ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them
by the great calculator and geometrician?
[Theod.] What do you mean, Socrates?
[Soc.] I mean that you rate them all at the same value,
whereas they are really separated by an interval, which no
geometrical ratio can express.
[Theod.] By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very
fair hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I
will retaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the
Stranger, who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to
proceed either with the Statesman or with the Philosopher,
whichever he prefers.
[Stranger] That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go
on, and not leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done
with Theaetetus?
[Theod.] In what respect?
[Str.] Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young
Socrates, instead of him? What do you advise?
[Theod.] Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose. The young
always do better when they have intervals of rest.
[Soc.] I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be
in some way related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the
cut of my ugly face, the other is called by my name. And we
should always be on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the
style of his conversation. I myself was discoursing with
Theaetetus yesterday, and I have just been listening to his
answers; my namesake I have not yet examined, but I must. Another
time will, do for me; to-day let him answer you.
[Str.] Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder
Socrates is proposing?
[Young Socrates] I do.
[Str.] And do you agree to his proposal?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] As you do not object, still less can I. After the
Sophist, then, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next
in the order of enquiry. And please to say, whether he, too,
should be ranked among those who have science.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] Then the sciences must be divided as before?
[Y.Soc.] I dare say.
[Str.] But yet the division will not be the same?
[Y.Soc.] How then?
[Str.] They will be divided at some other point.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We
must find and separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we
will set the mark of another class upon all diverging paths. Thus
the soul will conceive of ail kinds of knowledge under two
classes.
[Y.Soc.] To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not
mine.
[Str.] Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must
be yours as well as mine.
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred
arts, merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] But in the art of carpentering and all other
handicrafts, the knowledge of the workman is merged in his work;
he not only knows, but he also makes things which previously did
not exist.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Then let us divide sciences in general into those which
are practical and those which are-purely intellectual.
[Y.Soc.] Let us assume these two divisions of science, which
is one whole.
[Str.] And are "statesman," "king," "master,"
or "householder," one and the same; or is there a
science or art answering to each of these names? Or rather, allow
me to put the matter in another way.
[Y.Soc.] Let me hear.
[Str.] If any one who is in a private station has the skill to
advise one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a
physician?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] And if any one who is in a private station is able to
advise the ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the
knowledge which the ruler himself ought to have?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] But, surely the science of a true king is royal
science?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether
he happens to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in
reference to his art, be truly called "royal"?
[Y.Soc.] He certainly ought to be.
[Str.] And the householder and master are the same?
[Y.Soc.] Of course.
[Str.] Again, a large household may be compared to a small
state:-will they differ at all, as far as government is
concerned?
[Y.Soc.] They will not.
[Str.] Then, returning to the point which we were just now
discussing, do we not clearly see that there is one science of
all of them; and this science may be called either royal or
political or economical; we will not quarrel with any one about
the name.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly not.
[Str.] This too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with
his hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his
empire, compared with what he does by the intelligence and
strength of his mind.
[Y.Soc.] Clearly not.
[Str.] Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity
to knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in
general?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly he has.
[Str.] Then we may put all together as one and the same-statesmanship
and the statesman-the kingly science and the king.
[Y.Soc.] Clearly.
[Str.] And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we
go on to divide the sphere of knowledge?
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] Think whether you can find any joint or parting in
knowledge.
[Y.Soc.] Tell me of what sort.
[Str.] Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of
calculation?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] Which was, unmistakably, one of the arts of knowledge?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] And to this art of calculation which discerns the
differences of numbers shall we assign any other function except
to pass judgment on their differences?
[Y.Soc.] How could we?
[Str.] You know that the master-builder does not work himself,
but is the ruler of workmen?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] He contributes knowledge, not manual labour?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And may therefore be justly said to share in
theoretical science?
[Y.Soc.] Quite true.
[Str.] But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his
functions as at and when he has formed a judgment;-he must assign
to the individual workmen their appropriate task until they have
completed the work.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and
the like, subjects of pure knowledge; and is not the difference
between the two classes, that the one sort has the power of
judging only, and the other of ruling as well?
[Y.Soc.] That is evident.
[Str.] May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge,
there are there are two divisions-one which rules, and the other
which judges?
[Y.Soc.] I should think so.
[Str.] And when men have anything to do in common, that they
should be of one mind is surely a desirable thing?
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not
mind about the fancies of others?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly not.
[Str.] And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the
king?-Is he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign
to him the art of command-for he is a ruler?
[Y.Soc.] The latter, clearly.
[Str.] Then we must see whether there is any mark of division
in the art of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a
distinction similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer,
which parts off the king from the herald.
[Y.Soc.] How is this?
[Str.] Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again
the productions of others, which have been sold before?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly he does.
[Str.] And is not the herald under command, and does he not
receive orders, and in his turn give them to others?
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class
with the art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the
prophet, and the numerous kindred arts which exercise command;
or, as in the preceding comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or
sellers for themselves, and of retailers,-seeing, too, that the
class of supreme rulers, or rulers for themselves, is almost
nameless-shall we make a word following the same analogy, and
refer kings to a supreme or ruling-for-self science, leaving the
rest to receive a name from some one else? For we are seeking the
ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not a
ruler.
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between
the man who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's.
And now let us see if the supreme power allows of any further
division.
[Y.Soc.] By all means.
[Str.] I think that it does; and please to assist me in making
the division.
[Y.Soc.] At what point?
[Str.] May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake
of producing something?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things
produced into two classes.
[Y.Soc.] How would you divide them?
[Str.] Of the whole class some have life and some are without
life.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we
please, a subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands.
[Y.Soc.] At what point?
[Str.] One part may be set over the production of lifeless,
the other of living objects; and in this way the whole will be
divided.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave
one half, and take up the other; which may also be divided into
two.
[Y.Soc.] Which of the two halves do you men?
[Str.] Of course that which exercises command about animals.
For, surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman,
a science presiding over lifeless objects;-the king has a nobler
function, which is the management and control of living beings.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And the breeding and tending of living beings may be
observed to be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other
cases, a common care of creatures in flocks?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] But the statesman is not a tender of individuals-not
like the driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to
be compared with the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.
[Y.Soc.] Yes, I see, thanks to you.
[Str.] Shall we call this art of tending many animals
together, the art of managing a herd, or the art of collective
management?
[Y.Soc.] No matter;-Whichever suggests itself to us in the
course of conversation.
[Str.] Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too
particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when
you are an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion
of the name, -can you see a way in which a person, by showing the
art of herding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now
sought amongst twice the number of things, to be then sought
amongst half that number?
[Y.Soc.] I will try;-there appears to me to be one management
of men and another of beasts.
[Str.] You have certainly divided them in a most
straightforward and manly style; but you have fallen into an
error which hereafter I think that we had better avoid.
[Y.Soc.] What is the error?
[Str.] I think that we had better not cut off a single small
portion which is not a species, from many larger portions; the
part should be a species. To separate off at once the subject of
investigation, is a most excellent plan, if only the separation
be rightly made; and you were under the impression that you were
right, because you saw that you would come to man; and this led
you to hasten the steps. But you should not chip off too small a
piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through the middle;
which is also the more likely way of finding classes. Attention
to this principle makes all the difference in a process of
enquiry.
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean, Stranger?
[Str.] I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to
your good parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present
entirely explain myself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my
meaning a little clearer.
[Y.Soc.] What was the error of which, as you say, we were
guilty in our recent division?
[Str.] The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide
the human race, were to divide them after the fashion which
prevails in this part of the world; here they cut off the
Hellenes as one species, and all the other species of mankind,
which are innumerable, and have no ties or common language, they
include under the single name of "barbarians," and
because they have one name they are supposed to be of one species
also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten
thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species,
comprehending the first under another separate name, you might
say that here too was a single class, because you had given it a
single name. Whereas you would make a much better and more equal
and logical classification of numbers, if you divided them into
odd and even; or of the human species, if you divided them into
male and female; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or
any other tribe, and arrayed them against the rest of the world,
when you could no longer make a division into parts which were
also classes.
[Y.Soc.] Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a
part and a class could still be made somewhat plainer.
[Str.] O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a
very difficult task. We have already digressed further from our
original intention than we ought, and you would have us wander
still further away. But we must now return to our subject; and
hereafter, when there is a leisure hour, we will follow up the
other track; at the same time I wish you to guard against
imagining that you ever heard me declare-
[Y.Soc.] What?
[Str.] That a class and a part are distinct.
[Y.Soc.] What did I hear, then?
[Str.] That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no
similar necessity that a part should be a dass; that is the view
which I should always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates.
[Y.Soc.] So be it.
[Str.] There is another thing which I should like to know.
[Y.Soc.] What is it?
[Str.] The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not
mistaken, the exact place was at the question, Where you would
divide the management of herds. To this you appeared rather too
ready to answer that them were two species of animals; man being
one, and all brutes making up the other.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] I thought that in taking away a part you imagined that
the remainder formed a class, because you were able to call them
by the common name of brutes.
[Y.Soc.] That again is true.
[Str.] Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that
some wise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed
to be, were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and
set up cranes against all other animals to their own special
glorification, at the same time jumbling together all the others,
including man, under the appellation of brutes,-here would be the
sort of error which we must try to avoid.
[Y.Soc.] How can we be safe?
[Str.] If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we
shall be less likely to fall into that error.
[Y.Soc.] We had better not take the whole?
[Str.] Yes, there lay the source of error in our former
division.
[Y.Soc.] How?
[Str.] You remember how that part of the art of knowledge
which was concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of
living creatures,-I mean, with animals in herds?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] In that case, there was already implied a division of
all animals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be tamed
are called tame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And the political science of which we are in search, is
and ever was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to
gregarious animals.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] But then ought not to divide, as we did, taking the
whole class at once. Neither let us be in too great haste to
arrive quickly at the political science; for this mistake has
already brought upon us the misfortune of which the proverb
speaks.
[Y.Soc.] What misfortune?
[Str.] The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little
speed.
[Y.Soc.] And all the better, Stranger;-we got what we deserved.
[Str.] Very well: Let us then begin again, and endeavour to
divide the collective rearing of animals; for probably the
completion of the argument will best show what you are so anxious
to know. Tell me, then-
[Y.Soc.] What?
[Str.] Have you ever heard, as you very likely may-for I do
not suppose that you ever actually visited them-of the preserves
of fishes in the Nile, and in the ponds of the Great King; or you
may have seen similar preserves in wells at home?
[Y.Soc.] Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often
heard the others described.
[Str.] And you may have heard also, and may have been-assured
by report, although you have not travelled in those regions, of
nurseries of geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] I asked you, because here is a new division of the
management of herds, into the management of land and of water
herds.
[Y.Soc.] There is.
[Str.] And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective
rearing of herds into two corresponding parts, the one the
rearing of water, and the other the rearing of land herds?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] There is surely no need to ask which of these two
contains the royal art, for it is evident to everybody.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?
[Y.Soc.] How would you divide them?
[Str.] I should distinguish between those which fly and those
which walk.
[Y.Soc.] Most true.
[Str.] And where shall we look for the political animal? Might
not an idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] The art of managing the walking animal has to be
further divided, just as you might have an even number.
[Y.Soc.] Clearly.
[Str.] Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that
part or class which the argument aims at reaching-the one is
speedier way, which cuts off a small portion and leaves a large;
the other agrees better with the principle which we were laying
down, that as far as we can we should divide in the middle; but
it is longer. We can take either of them, whichever we please.
[Y.Soc.] Cannot we have both ways?
[Str.] Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in
turn, you clearly may.
[Y.Soc.] Then I should like to have them in turn.
[Str.] There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if
we had been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have
demurred to your request; but now, in accordance with your
desire, let us begin with the longer way; while we are fresh, we
shall get on better. And now attend to the division.
[Y.Soc.] Let me hear.
[Str.] The tame walking herding animals are distributed by
nature into two classes.
[Y.Soc.] Upon what principle?
[Str.] The one grows horns; and the other is without horns.
[Y.Soc.] Clearly.
[Str.] Suppose that you divide the science which manages
pedestrian animals into two corresponding parts, and define them;
for if you try to invent names for them, you will find the
intricacy too great.
[Y.Soc.] How must I speak of them, then?
[Str.] In this way: let the science of managing pedestrian
animals be divided into two parts and one part assigned to the
horned herd and the other to the herd that has no horns.
[Y.Soc.] All that you say has been abundantly proved, and may
therefore, be assumed.
[Str.] The king is clearly the shepherd a polled herd, who
have no horns.
[Y.Soc.] That is evident.
[Str.] Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and
endeavour to assign to him what is his?
[Y.Soc.] By all means.
[Str.] Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having
cloven feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know
what I mean.
[Y.Soc.] What?
[Str.] I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one
another.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals
will not mix the breed.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] And of which has the Statesman charge,-of the mixed or
of the unmixed race?
[Y.Soc.] Clearly of the unmixed.
[Str.] I suppose that we must divide this again as before.
[Y.Soc.] We must.
[Str.] Every tame and herding animal has now been split up,
with the exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs
should be reckoned among gregarious animals.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two
remaining species?
[Str.] There is a measure of difference which may be
appropriately employed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of
geometry.
[Y.Soc.] What is that?
[Str.] The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter.
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two
feet?
[Y.Soc.] Just so.
[Str.] And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of
twice two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly
understand you.
[Str.] In these divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make
another famous jest.
[Y.Soc.] What is it?
[Str.] Human beings have come out in the same class with the
freest and airiest of creation, and have been running a race with
them.
[Y.Soc.] I remark that very singular coincidence.
[Str.] And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last?
[Y.Soc.] Indeed I should.
[Str.] And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that
the king is found running about with the herd and in close
competition with the bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of
an adept at the airy life.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the
truth of what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist?
[Y.Soc.] What?
[Str.] That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons,
and does not set the great above the small, but always arrives in
her own way at the truest result.
[Y.Soc.] Clearly.
[Str.] And now, I will not wait for you to ask the, but will
of my own accord take you by the shorter road to the definition
of a king.
[Y.Soc.] By all means.
[Str.] I say that we should have begun at first by dividing
land animals into biped and quadruped; and since the winged herd,
and that alone, comes out in the same class with man, should
divide bipeds into those which have feathers and those which have
not, and when they have been divided, and the art of the
management of mankind is brought to light, the time will have
come to produce our Statesman and ruler, and set him like a
charioteer in his place, and hand over to him the reins of state,
for that too is a vocation which belongs to him.
[Y.Soc.] Very good; you have paid me the debt-I mean, that you
have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the
digression by way of interest.
[Str.] Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the
links, which together make the definition of the name of the
Statesman's art.
[Y.Soc.] By all means.
[Str.] The science of pure knowledge had, as we said
originally, a part which was the science of rule or command, and
from this was derived another part, which was called command-for-self,
on the analogy of selling-for-self; an important section of this
was the management of living animals, and this again was further
limited to the manage merit of them in herds; and again in herds
of pedestrian animals. The chief division of the latter was the
art of managing pedestrian animals which are without horns; this
again has a part which can only be comprehended under one term by
joining together three names-shepherding pure-bred animals. The
only further subdivision is the art of man herding-this has to do
with bipeds, and is what we were seeking after, and have now
found, being at once the royal and political.
[Y.Soc.] To be sure.
[Str.] And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as
you say?
[Y.Soc.] What?
[Str.] Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled our
intention?-There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the
investigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out: this is
where the enquiry fails.
[Y.Soc.] I do not understand.
[Str.] I will try to make the thought, which is at this moment
present in my mind, clearer to us both.
[Y.Soc.] Let me hear.
[Str.] There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them
was the political, which had the charge of one particular herd?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing,
not horses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man
collectively?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the
king from all other shepherds.
[Y.Soc.] To what do you refer?
[Str.] I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen
has a rival who professes and claims to share with him in the
management of the herd?
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] I mean to say that merchants husbandmen, providers of
food, and also training-masters and physicians, will all contend
with the herdsmen of humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring
that they themselves have the care of rearing of managing
mankind, and that they rear not only the common herd, but also
the rulers themselves.
[Y.Soc.] Are they not right in saying so?
[Str.] Very likely they may be, and we will consider their
claim. But we are certain of this,-that no one will raise a
similar claim as against the herdsman, who is allowed on all
hands to be the sole and only feeder and physician of his herd;
he is also their matchmaker and accoucheur; no one else knows
that department of science. And he is their merry-maker and
musician, as far as their nature is susceptible of such
influences, and no one can console and soothe his own herd better
than he can, either with the natural tones of his voice or with
instruments. And the same may be said of tenders of animals in
general.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] But if this is as you say, can our argument about the
king be true and unimpeachable? Were we right in selecting him
out of ten thousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer
of the human flock?
[Y.Soc.] Surely not.
[Str.] Had we not reason just to now apprehend, that although
we may have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet
accurately worked out the true image of the Statesman? and that
we cannot reveal him as he truly is in his own nature, until we
have disengaged and separated him from those who bang about him
and claim to share in his prerogatives?
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not
mean to bring disgrace upon the argument at its close.
[Y.Soc.] We must certainly avoid that.
[Str.] Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a
different road.
[Y.Soc.] What road?
[Str.] I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a
famous tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be
interwoven, and then we may resume our series of divisions, and
proceed in the old path until we arrive at the desired summit.
Shall we do as I say?
[Y.Soc.] By all means.
[Str.] Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to
hear; and you are not too old for childish amusement.
[Y.Soc.] Let me hear.
[Str.] There did really happen, and will again happen, like
many other events of which ancient tradition has preserved the
record, the portent which is traditionally said to have occurred
in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes. You have heard no doubt,
and remember what they say happened at that time?
[Y.Soc.] I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the
golden lamb.
[Str.] No, not that; but another part of the story, which
tells how the sun and the stars once rose in the west, and set in
the east, and that the god reversed their motion, and gave them
that which they now have as a testimony to the right of Atreus.
[Y.Soc.] Yes; there is that legend also.
[Str.] Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos.
[Y.Soc.] Yes, very often.
[Str.] Did you ever hear that the men of former times were
earthborn, and not begotten of one another?
[Y.Soc.] Yes, that is another old tradition.
[Str.] All these stories, and ten thousand others which are
still more wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have
been lost in the lapse of ages, or are repeated only in a
disconnected form; but the origin of them is what no one has
told, and may as well be told now; for the tale is suited to
throw light on the nature of the king.
[Y.Soc.] Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole
story, and leave out nothing.
[Str.] Listen, then. There is a time when God himself guides
and helps to roll the world in its course; and there is a time,
on the completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the
world being a living creature, and having originally received
intelligence from its author and creator turns about and by an
inherent necessity revolves in the opposite direction.
[Y.Soc.] Why is that?
[Str.] Why, because only the most divine things of all remain
ever unchanged and the same, and body is not included in this
class. Heaven and the universe, as we have termed them, although
they have been endowed by the Creator with many glories, partake
of a bodily nature, and therefore cannot be entirely free from
perturbation. But their motion is, as far as possible, single and
in the same place, and of the same kind; and is therefore only
subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration possible.
For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of
himself; and to think that he moves them at one time in one
direction and at another time in another is blasphemy. Hence we
must not say that the world is either self-moved always, or all
made to go round by God in two opposite courses; or that two
Gods, having opposite purposes, make it move round. But as I have
already said (and this is the only remaining alternative) the
world is guided at one time by an external power which is divine
and receives fresh life and immortality from the renewing hand of
the Creator, and again, when let go, moves spontaneously, being
set free at such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of
years, a reverse movement: this is due to its perfect balance, to
its vast size, and to the fact that it turns on the smallest
pivot.
[Y.Soc.] Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable
indeed.
[Str.] Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been
said the nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the
cause of all these wonders. It is this.
[Y.Soc.] What?
[Str.] The reversal which takes place from time to time of the
motion of the universe.
[Y.Soc.] How is that the cause?
[Str.] Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider
this to be the greatest and most complete.
[Y.Soc.] I should imagine so.
[Str.] And it may be supposed to result in the greatest
changes to the human beings who are the inhabitants of the world
at the time.
[Y.Soc.] Such changes would naturally occur.
[Str.] And animals, as we know, survive with difficulty great
and serious changes of many different kinds when they come upon
them at once.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of
them, which extends also to-the life of man; few survivors of the
race are left, and those who remain become the subjects of
several novel and remarkable phenomena, and of one in particular,
which takes place at the time when the transition is made to the
cycle opposite to that in which we are now living.
[Y.Soc.] What is it?
[Str.] The life of all animals first came to a standstill, and
the mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then
reversed and grew young and delicate; the white locks of the aged
darkened again, and the cheeks the bearded man became smooth, and
recovered their former bloom; the bodies of youths in their prime
grew softer and smaller, continually by day and night returning
and becoming assimilated to the nature of a newly-born child in
mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they wasted away
and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who died by
violence at that time quickly passed through the like changes,
and in a few days were no more seen.
[Y.Soc.] Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those
days; and in what way were they begotten of one another?
[Str.] It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing
in the then order of nature as the procreation of animals from
one another; the earth-born race, of which we hear in story, was
the one which existed in those days-they rose again from the
ground; and of this tradition, which is now-a-days often unduly
discredited, our ancestors, who were nearest in point of time to
the end of the last period and came into being at the beginning
of this, are to us the heralds. And mark how consistent the
sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth, follows
the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life;
simultaneously with the reversal of the world the wheel of their
generation has been turned back, and they are put together and
rise and live in the opposite order, unless God has carried any
of them away to some other lot. According to this tradition they
of necessity sprang from the earth and have the name of earth-born,
and so the above legend clings to them.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly that is quite consistent with what has
preceded; but tell me, was the life which you said existed in the
reign of Cronos in that cycle of the world, or in this? For the
change in the course of the stars and the sun must have occurred
in both.
[Str.] I see that you enter into my meaning;-no, that blessed
and spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the
world, but to the previous one, in which God superintended the
whole revolution of the universe; and the several parts the
universe were distributed under the rule. certain inferior
deities, as is the way in some places still There were demigods,
who were the shepherds of the various species and herds of
animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of
whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any violence, or
devouring of one another or war or quarrel among them; and I
might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to
that dispensation. The reason why the life of man was, as
tradition says, spontaneous, is as follows: In those days God
himself was their shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man,
over them, who is by comparison a divine being, still rules over
the lower animals. Under him there were no forms of government or
separate possession of women and children; for all men rose again
from the earth, having no memory, of the past. And although they
had nothing of this sort, the earth gave them fruits in
abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not
planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in
the open air, for the temperature of their seasons, was mild; and
they had no beds, but lay on Soft couches of grass, which grew
plentifully out of: the earth. Such was the life of man in the
days of Cronos, Socrates; the character of our present life which
is said to be under Zeus, you know from your own experience. Can
you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the happier?
[Y.Soc.] Impossible.
[Str.] Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?
[Y.Soc.] By all means.
[Str.] Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this
boundless leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only
with men, but with the brute creation, had used all these
advantages with a view to philosophy, conversing with the brutes
as well as with one another, and learning of every nature which
was gifted with any special power, and was able to contribute
some special experience to the store of wisdom there would be no
difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times
happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had
merely eaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories to
one another and to the animals-such stories as are now attributed
to them-in this case also, as I should imagine, the answer would
be easy. But until some satisfactory witness can be found of the
love of that age for knowledge and: discussion, we had better let
the matter drop, and give the reason why we have unearthed this
tale, and then we shall be able to get on.
In the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and
the earth-born race had all perished, and every soul had
completed its proper cycle of births and been sown in the earth
her appointed number of times, the pilot of the universe let the
helm go, and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and
innate desire reversed the motion of the world. Then also all the
inferior deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being
informed of what was happening, let go the parts of the world
which were under their control. And the world turning round with
a sudden shock, being impelled in an opposite direction from
beginning to end, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, which
wrought a new destruction of all manner of animals. Afterwards,
when sufficient time had elapsed, the tumult and confusion and
earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at peace
attained to a calm, and settle down into his own orderly and
accustomed course, having the charge and rule of himself and of
all the creatures which are contained in him, and executing, as
far as he remembered them, the instructions of his Father and
Creator, more precisely at first, but afterwords with less
exactness. The reason of the falling off was the admixture of
matter in him; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was
full of disorder, until attaining to the present order. From God,
the constructor; the world received all that is good in him, but
from a previous state came elements of evil and unrighteousness,
which, thence derived, first of all passed into the world, and
were then transmitted to the animals. While the world was aided
by the pilot in nurturing the animals, the evil was small, and
great the good which he produced, but after the separation, when
the world was let go, at first all proceeded well enough; but, as
time went there was more and more forgetting, and the old discord
again held sway and burst forth in full glory; and at last small
was the good, and great was the admixture of evil, and there was
a danger of universal ruin to the world, and the things contained
in him. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care,
seeing that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all
might be dissolved in the storm and disappear in infinite chaos,
again seated himself at the helm; and bringing back the elements
which had fallen into dissolution and disorder to the motion
which had prevailed under his dispensation, he set them in order
and restored them, and made the world imperishable and immortal.
And this is the whole tale, of which the first part will
suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For when the world
turned towards the present cycle of generation, the age of man
again stood still, and a change opposite to the previous one was
the result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew
in and stature, and the newly-born children of the earth became
grey and died and sank into the earth again. All things changed,
imitating and following the condition of the universe, and of
necessity agreeing with that in their mode of conception and
generation and nurture; for no animal; was any longer allowed to
come into being in the earth through the agency of other creative
beings, but as the world was ordained to be the lord of his own
progress, in like manner the parts were ordained to grow and
generate and give nourishment, as far as they could, of
themselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have
arrived at the real end of this discourse; for although there
might be much to tell of the lower animals, and of the condition
out of which they changed and of the causes of the change, about
men there is not much, and that little is more to the purpose.
Deprived of the care of God, who had possessed and tended them,
they were left helpless and defenceless, and were torn in pieces
by the beasts, who were naturally fierce and had now grown wild.
And in the first ages they were still without skill or resource;
the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and as yet
they knew not how to procure it, because they-had never felt the
pressure of necessity. For all these reasons they were in a great
strait; wherefore also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition
were imparted to man by the gods, together with so much teaching
and education as was indispensable; fire was given to them by
Prometheus, the arts by Hephaestus and his fellow-worker, Athene,
seeds and plants by others. From these is derived all that has
helped to frame human life; since the care of the Gods, as I was
saying, had now failed men, and they had to order their course of
life for themselves, and were their own masters, just like the
universal creature whom they imitate and follow, ever changing,
as he changes, and ever living and growing, at one time in one
manner, and at another time in another. Enough of the story,
which may be of use in showing us how greatly we erred in the
delineation of the king and the statesman in our previous
discourse.
[Y.Soc.] What was this great error of which you speak?
[Str.] There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was
an error on a much larger and grander scale.
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and
statesman of the present; and generation, we told of a shepherd
of a human flock who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who
was a god when he ought to have been a man; and this a great
error. Again, we declared him to be, the ruler of the entire
State, without, explaining how: this was not the whole truth, nor
very intelligible; but still it was true, and therefore the
second error was not so, great as the first.
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] Before we can expect to have a perfect description of
the statesman we must define the nature of his office.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] And the myth was introduced in order to show, not only
that all others are rivals of true shepherd who is the object of
our search, but in order that we might have a clearer view of him
who is alone worthy to receive this appellation, because, he
alone of shepherds and herdsmen, according to the image which we
have employed, has the care of human beings.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of
the divine shepherd is even higher than that of a king; whereas
the statesmen who are now on earth seem to be much more like
their subjects in character, and which more nearly to partake of
their breeding and education.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Still they must be investigated all the same, to see
whether, like the divine shepherd, they are above their subjects
or on a level with them.
[Y.Soc.] Of course.
[Str.] To resume:-Do you remember that we spoke of a command-for-self
exercised over animals, not singly but collectively, which we
called the art of rearing a herd?
[Y.Soc.] Yes, I remember.
[Str.] There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included
or mentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no
place in our nomenclature.
[Y.Soc.] How was that?
[Str.] All other herdsmen "rear" their herds, but
this is not a suitable term to apply to the Statesman; we should
use a name which is common to them all.
[Y.Soc.] True, if there be such a name.
[Str.] Why, is not "care" of herds applicable to
all? For this implies no feeding, or any special duty; if we say
either "tending" the herds, or "managing" the
herds, or "having the care" of them, the same word will
include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the rest,
as the argument seems to require.
[Y.Soc.] Quite right; but how shall we take the-next step in
the division?
[Str.] As before we divided the art of "rearing"
herds accordingly as they were land or water herds, winged and
wingless, mixing or not mixing the breed, horned and hornless, so
we may divide by these same differences the "teading"
of herds, comprehending in our definition the kingship of to-day
and the rule of Cronos.
[Y.Soc.] That is clear; but I still ask, what is to follow.
[Str.] If the word had been "managing" herds,
instead of feeding or rearing them, no one would have argued that
there was no care of men in the case of the politician, although
it was justly contended, that there was no human art of feeding
them which was worthy of the name, or at least, if there were,
many a man had a prior and greater right to share in such an art
than any king.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] But no other art or science will have a prior or better
right than the royal science to care for human society and to
rule over men in general.
[Y.Soc.] Quite true.
[Str.] In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that
a great error was committed at the end of our analysis.
[Y.Soc.] What was it?
[Str.] Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such
an art as the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no
reason why we should call this the royal or political art, as
though there were no more to be said.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly not.
[Str.] Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the
name, so as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding,
and then to divide, for there may be still considerable divisions.
[Y.Soc.] How can they be made?
[Str.] First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human
guardian or manager.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And the art of management which is assigned to man
would again have to be subdivided.
[Y.Soc.] On what principle?
[Str.] On the principle of voluntary and compulsory.
[Y.Soc.] Why?
[Str.] Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error
here; for our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together,
whereas they are utterly distinct, like their modes of government.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and
divide human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary
and compulsory.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] And if we call the management of violent rulers
tyranny, and the voluntary management of herds of voluntary
bipeds politics, may we not further assert that he who has this
latter art of management is the true king and statesman?
[Y.Soc.] I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the
account of the Statesman.
[Str.] Would that we had Socrates, but I have to satisfy
myself as well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king
is not yet perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great
haste, having overdone the several parts of their work, lose time
in cutting them down, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out
of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire to expose our former
error, and also because we imagined that a king required grand
illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable, and have
been obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us
discourse at large, and, nevertheless, the story never came to an
end. And our discussion might be compared to a picture of some
living being which had been fairly drawn in outline, but had not
yet attained the life and clearness which is given by the
blending of colours. Now to intelligent persons a living being
had better be delineated by language and discourse than by any
painting or work of art: to the duller sort by works of art.
[Y.Soc.] Very true; but what is the imperfection which still
remains? I wish that you would tell me.
[Str.] The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set
forth except through the medium of examples; every man seems to
know all things in a dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake
up and to know nothing.
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a
question about our experience of knowledge.
[Y.Soc.] Why so?
[Str.] Why, because my "example" requires the
assistance of another example.
[Y.Soc.] Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire.
[Str.] I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener
in you: when children are beginning to know their letters-
[Y.Soc.] What are you going to say?
[Str.] That they distinguish the several letters well enough
in very short and easy syllables, and are able to tell them
correctly.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them,
and think and speak falsely of them.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a
knowledge of what they do not as yet know be-
[Y.Soc.] Be what?
[Str.] To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge
correctly about the letters in question, and then to compare
these with the cases in which they do not as yet know, and to
show them that the letters are the same, and have the same
character in both combination, until all cases in which they are
right have been Placed side by side with all cases in which they
are wrong. In this way they have examples, and are made to learn
that each letter in every combination is always the same and not
another, and is always called by the same name.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing
and compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing,
of which we have a right conception, and out of the comparison
there arises one true notion, which includes both of them.
[Y.Soc.] Exactly.
[Str.] Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same
uncertainty about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in
some cases is firmly fixed by the truth in each particular, and
then, again, in other cases is altogether at sea; having somehow
or other a correction of combinations; but when the elements are
transferred into the long and difficult language (syllables) of
facts, is again ignorant of them?
[Y.Soc.] There is nothing wonderful in that.
[Str.] Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion
ever expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to
attain wisdom?
[Y.Soc.] Hardly.
[Str.] Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see
the nature of example in general in a small and particular
instance; afterwards from lesser things we intend to pass to the
royal class, which is the highest form of the same nature, and
endeavour to discover by rules of art what the management of
cities is; and then the dream will become a reality to us.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument,
and as there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim
to have the care of states, let us part them all off, and leave
him alone; and, as I was saying, a model or example of this
process has first to be framed.
[Y.Soc.] Exactly.
[Str.] What model is there which is small, and yet has any
analogy with the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if
we have no other example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more
precisely, weaving of wool-this will be quite enough, without
taking the whole of weaving, to illustrate our meaning?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes
of division and subdivision which we have already applied to
other classes; going once more as rapidly as we can through all
the steps until we come to that which is needed for our purpose?
[Y.Soc.] How do you mean?
[Str.] I shall reply by actually performing the process.
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] All things which we make or acquire are either creative
or preventive; of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and
human, and also defences; and defences are either military
weapons or protections; and protections are veils, and also
shields against heat and cold, and shields against heat and cold
are shelters and coverings; and coverings are blankets and
garments; and garments are some of them in one piece, and others
of them are made in several parts; and of these latter some are
stitched, others are fastened and not stitched; and of the not
stitched, some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of
hair; and of these, again, some are cemented with water and
earth, and others are fastened together by themselves. And these
last defences and coverings which are fastened together by
themselves are called clothes, and the art which superintends
them we may call, from the nature of the operation, the art of
clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman was derived
from the State; and may we not say that the art of weaving, at
least that largest portion of it which was concerned with the
making of clothes, differs only in name from this art of
clothing, in the same way that, in the previous case, the royal
science differed from the political?
[Y.Soc.] Most true.
[Str.] In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the
art of weaving clothes, which an incompetent person might fancy
to have been sufficiently described, has been separated off from
several others which are of the same family, but not from the co-operative
arts.
[Y.Soc.] And which are the kindred arts?
[Str.] I see that I have not taken you with me. So I think
that we had better go backwards, starting from the end. We just
now parted off from the weaving of clothes, the making of
blankets, which differ from each other in that one is put under
and the other is put around! and these are what I termed kindred
arts.
[Y.Soc.] I understand.
[Str.] And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles
made of flax and cords, and all that we just now metaphorically
termed the sinews of plants, and we have also separated off the
process of felting and the putting together of materials by
stitching and sewing, of which the most important part is the
cobbler's art.
[Y.Soc.] Precisely.
[Str.] Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared
coverings in entire pieces, and the art of sheltering, and
subtracted the various arts of making water-tight which are
employed in building, and in general in carpentering, and in
other crafts, and all such arts as furnish impediments to
thieving and acts of violence, and are concerned with making the
lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being divisions of the art
of joining; and we also cut off the manufacture of arms, which is
a section of the great and manifold art of making defences; and
we originally began by parting off the whole of the magic art
which is concerned with antidoter, and have left, as would
appear, the very art of which we were in search, the art of
protection against winter cold, which fabricates woollen
defences, and has the name of weaving.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for the first process
to which the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving.
[Y.Soc.] How so?
[Str.] Weaving is a sort of uniting?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] But the first process is a separation of the clotted
and matted fibres?
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say
that carding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly not.
[Str.] Again, if a person were to say that the art of making
the warp and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what
was paradoxical and false.
[Y.Soc.] To be sure.
[Str.] Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the
mender has nothing to do with the care and treatment clotes, or
are we to regard all these as arts of weaving?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly not.
[Str.] And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they
are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes; they
will dispute the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though
assigning a larger sphere to that, will still reserve a
considerable field for themselves.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Besides these, there are the arts which make tools and
instruments of weaving, and which will claim at least to be
cooperative causes in every work of the weaver.
[Y.Soc.] Most true.
[Str.] Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather
that part of it which has been selected by us, to be the greatest
and noblest of arts which are concerned with woollen garments-shall
we be right? Is not the definition, although true, wanting in
clearness and completeness; for do not all those other arts
require to be first cleared away?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order
that the argument may proceed in a regular manner?
[Y.Soc.] By all means.
[Str.] Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two
kinds of arts entering into everything which we do.
[Y.Soc.] What are they?
[Str.] The one kind is the conditional or cooperative, the
other the principal cause.
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but
which furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, without
which the several arts could not fulfil their appointed work, are
co-operative; but those which make the things themselves are
causal.
[Y.Soc.] A very reasonable distinction.
[Str.] Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other
instruments of the production of clothes may be called co-operative,
and those which treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] The arts of washing and mending, and the other
preparatory arts which belong to the causal class, and form a
division of the great art of adornment, may be all comprehended
under what we call the fuller's art.
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the
process which are concerned with the actual manufacture of a
woollen garment form a single art, which is one of thow
universally acknowledged-the art of working in wool.
[Y.Soc.] To be sure.
[Str.] Of working in wool again, there are two divisions, and
both these are parts of two arts at once.
[Y.Soc.] How is that?
[Str.] Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the
other processes of wool-working which separate the composite, may
be classed together as belonging both to the art of woolworking,
and also to one of the two great arts which are of universal
application-the art of composition and the art of division.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] To the latter belong carding and the other processes of
which I was just now speaking the art of discernment or division
in wool and yarn, which is effected in one manner with the comb
and in another with the hands, is variously described under all
the names which I just now mentioned.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Again, let us take some process of woolworking which is
also a portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the
elements of division which we found there, make two halves, one
on the principle of composition, and the other on the principle
of division.
[Y.Soc.] Let that be done.
[Str.] And once more, Socrates, we must divide the part which
belongs at once both to woolworking and composition, if we are
ever to discover satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving.
[Y.Soc.] We must.
[Str.] Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the
art of twisting threads, the other the art of combining them.
[Y.Soc.] Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be
referring to manufacture of the warp?
[Str.] Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is
the woof made?
[Y.Soc.] There is no other way.
[Str.] Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for
I think that the definition will be of use to you.
[Y.Soc.] How shall I define them?
[Str.] As thus: A piece of carded wool which is drawn out
lengthwise and breadth-wise is said to be pulled out.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] And the wool thus prepared when twisted by the spindle,
and made into a firm thread, is called the warp, And the art
which regulates these operations the art of spinning the warp.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And the threads which are more loosely spun, having a
softness proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the
degree of force used in dressing the cloth-the threads which are
thus spun are called the woof, and the art which is set over them
may be called the art of spinning the woof.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of
the part of weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when
that part of the art of composition which is employed in the
working of wool forms a web by the regular intertexture of warp
and woof, the entire woven substance is called by us a woollen
garment, and the art which presides over this is the art of
weaving.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art
of entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless
circuit?
[Y.Soc.] I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless
in what was said.
[Str.] Very likely, but you may not always think so, my sweet
friend; and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should
hereafter arise in your mind, as it very well may, let me lay
down a principle which will apply to arguments in general.
[Y.Soc.] Proceed.
[Str.] Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess
and defect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we
may praise or blame too much length or too much shortness in
discussions of this kind.
[Y.Soc.] Let us do so.
[Str.] The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are
the following:-
[Y.Soc.] What?
[Str.] Length and shortness, excess and defect; with all of
these the art of measurement is conversant.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] And the art of measurement has to be divided into two
parts, with a view to our present purpose.
[Y.Soc.] Where would you make the division?
[Str.] As thus: I would make two parts, one having regard to
the relativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and
there is another, without which the existence of production would
be impossible.
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] Do you not think that it is only natural for the
greater to be called greater with reference to the less alone,
and the less reference to the greater alone?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] Well, but is there not also something exceeding and
exceeded by the principle of the mean, both in speech and action,
and is not this a reality, and the chief mark of difference
between good and bad men?
[Y.Soc.] Plainly.
[Str.] Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and
are discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying
before, only relatively to one another, but there must also be
another comparison of them with the mean or ideal standard; would
you like to hear the reason why?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to
the less, there will never be any comparison of either with the
mean.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts
and their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the
aforesaid art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the
watch against excess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real
evils, which occasion a difficulty in action; and the excellence
of beauty of every work of art is due to this observance of
measure.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the
search for the royal science will be impossible.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted
the inference that not-being had an existence, because here was
the point at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we
must endeavour to show that the greater and, less are not only to
be measured with one another, but also have to do with the
production of the mean; for if this is not admitted, neither a
statesman nor any other man of action can be an undisputed master
of his science.
[Y.Soc.] Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.
[Str.] But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other,
of which we only too well remember the length. I think, however,
that we may fairly assume something of this sort-
[Y.Soc.] What?
[Str.] That we shall some day require this notion of a mean
with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile,
the argument that the very existence of the arts must be held to
depend on the possibility of measuring more or less, not only
with one another, but also with a view to the attainment of the
mean, seems to afford a grand support and satisfactory proof of
the doctrine which we are maintaining; for if there are arts,
there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of
measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is
neither.
[Y.Soc.] True; and what is the next step?
[Str.] The next step clearly is to divide the art of
measurement into two parts, all we have said already, and to
place in the one part all the arts which measure number, length,
depth, breadth, swiftness with their opposites; and to have
another part in which they are measured with the mean, and the
fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those words, in
short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the extremes.
[Y.Soc.] Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very
different spheres.
[Str.] There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say,
believing themselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement
is universal, and has to do with all things. And this means what
we are now saying; for all things which come within the province
of art do certainly in some sense partake of measure. But these
persons, because they are not accustomed to distinguish classes
according to real forms, jumble together two widely different
things, relation to one another, and to a standard, under the
idea that they are the same, and also fall into the converse
error of dividing other things not according to their real parts.
Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of
things, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has
found all the differences contained in it which form distinct
classes; nor again should he be able to rest contented with the
manifold diversities which are seen in a multitude of things
until he has comprehended all of them that have any affinity
within the bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the
reality of a single kind. But we have said enough on this head,
and also of excess and defect; we have only to bear in mind that
two divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered
which are concerned with them, and not forget what they are.
[Y.Soc.] We will not forget.
[Str.] And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on
to consider another question, which concerns not this argument
only but the conduct of such arguments in general.
[Y.Soc.] What is this new question?
[Str.] Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his
letters: when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we
say that the question is intended to improve his grammatical
knowledge of that particular word, or of all words?
[Y.Soc.] Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge
of all words.
[Str.] And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to
improve our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning
generally?
[Y.Soc.] Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is
general.
[Str.] Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the
notion of weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget
that some things have sensible images, which are readily known,
and can be easily pointed out when any one desires to answer an
enquirer without any trouble or argument; whereas the greatest
and highest truths have no outward image of themselves visible to
man, which he who wishes to satisfy the soul of the enquirer can
adapt to the eye of sense, and therefore we ought to train
ourselves to give and accept a rational account of them; for
immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, are shown
only in thought and idea, and in no other way, and all that we
are now saying is said for the sake of them. Moreover, there is
always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters than
on great.
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] Let us call to mind the bearing of all this.
[Y.Soc.] What is it?
[Str.] I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness
which we may have experienced in the discussion about weaving,
and the reversal of the universe, and in the discussion
concerning the Sophist and the being of not-being. I know that
they were felt to be too long, and I reproached myself with this,
fearing that they might be not only tedious but irrelevant; and
all that I have now said is only designed to prevent the
recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future.
[Y.Soc.] Very good. Will you proceed?
[Str.] Then I would like to observe that you and I,
remembering what has been said, should praise or blame the length
or shortness of discussions, not by comparing them with one
another, but with what is fitting, having regard to the part of
measurement, which, as we said, was to be borne in mind.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a
view to what is fitting; for we should only want such a length as
is suited to give pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and
reason tells us, that we should be contented to make the ease or
rapidity of an enquiry, not our first, but our second object; the
first and highest of all being to assert the great method of
division according to species-whether the discourse be shorter or
longer is not to the point. No offence should be taken at length,
but the longer and shorter are to be employed indifferently,
according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen the
wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures
the length of discourses on such occasions and cannot away with
their circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to
have done with them, when he can only complain that they are
tedious, but he should prove that if they had been shorter they
would have made those who took part in them better dialecticians,
and more capable of expressing the truth of things; about any
other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself-he should
pretend not to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you
will probably agree with me in thinking. Let us return to our
Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid example of weaving.
[Y.Soc.] Very good;-let us do as you say.
[Str.] The art of the king has been separated from the similar
arts of shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do
with herds at all. There still remain, however, of the causal and
co-operative arts those which are immediately concerned with
States, and which must first be distinguished from one another.
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into
two halves; the reason will be very: evident as we proceed.
[Y.Soc.] Then we had better do so.
[Str.] We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs,
since we cannot bisect them. For we certainly should divide
everything into as few parts as possible.
[Y.Soc.] What is to be done in this case?
[Str.] What we did in the example of weaving-all those arts
which furnish the tools were regarded by us as co-operative.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make
any implement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded
by us as co-operative, for without them neither State nor
Statesmanship would be possible; and yet we are not inclined to
say that any of them is a product of the kingly art.
[Y.Soc.] No, indeed.
[Str.] The task of separating this class from others is not an
easy one; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in
the world is the instrument of doing something. But there is
another dass of possessions in, a city, of which I have a word to
say.
[Y.Soc.] What class do you mean?
[Str.] A class which may be described as not having this
power; that is to say, not like an instrument, framed for
production, but designed for the preservation of that which is
produced.
[Y.Soc.] To what do you refer?
[Str.] To the class of vessels, as they are comprehensively
termed, which are constructed for the preservation of things
moist and dry, of things prepared in the fire or out of the fire;
this is a very large class, and has, if I am not mistaken,
literally nothing to do with the royal art of which we are in
search.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly not.
[Str.] There is also a third class of possessions to be noted,
different from these and very extensive, moving or resting on
land or water, honourable and also dishonourable. The whole of
this class has one name, because it is intended to be sat upon,
being always a seat for something.
[Y.Soc.] What is it?
[Str.] A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the
Statesman, but of the carpenter, potter, and coppersmith.
[Y.Soc.] I understand.
[Str.] And is there not a fourth class which is again
different, and in which most of the things formerly mentioned are
contained-every kind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and
enclosures, whether of earth or stone, and ten thousand other
thing? all of which being made for the sake of defence, may be
truly called defences, and are for the most part to be regarded
as the work of the builder or of the weaver, rather than of the
Statesman.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and
drawing, and of the imitations produced, by drawing and music,
which are designed for amusement only, and may be fairly
comprehended under one name?
[Y.Soc.] What is it?
[Str.] Plaything is the name.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them,
for none of these things have a serious purpose-amusement is
their sole aim.
[Y.Soc.] That again I understand.
[Str.] Then there is a class which provides materials for all
these, out of which and in which the arts already mentioned
fabricate their works;-this manifold class, I say, which is the
creation and offspring of many other arts, may I not rank sixth?
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] I am referring to gold, silver, and other metals, and
all that wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the
art of carpentry and plaiting; and there is the process of
barking and stripping the cuticle of plants, and the currier's
art, which strips off the skins of animals, and other similar
arts which manufacture corks and papyri and cords, and provide
for the manufacture of composite species out of simple kinds-the
whole class may be termed the primitive and simple possession of
man, and with this the kingly science has no concern at all.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] The provision of food and of all other things which
mingle their particles with the particles of the human body; and
minister to the body, will form a seventh class, which may be
called by the general term of nourishment, unless you have any
better name to offer. This, however, appertains rather to the
husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor, cook, and is not to be
assigned to the Statesman's art.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly not.
[Str.] These seven classes include nearly every description of
property, with the exception of tame animals. Consider;-there was
the original material, which ought to have been placed first;
next come instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings,
nourishment; small things, which may be-included under one of
these-as for example, coins, seals and stamps, are omitted, for
they have not in them the character of any larger kind which
includes them; but some of them may, with a little forcing, be
placed among ornaments, and others may be made to harmonize with
the class of implements. The art of herding, which has been
already divided into parts, will include all property in tame
animals except slaves.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I
suspect that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are
the rivals of the king in the formation of the political web,
will be discovered; just as spinners, carders, and the rest of
them, were the rivals of the weaver. All the others, who were
termed co-operators, have been got rid of among the occupations
already mentioned, and separated from the royal and political
science.
[Y.Soc.] I agree.
[Str.] Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more
certain of the complexion of this remaining class.
[Y.Soc.] Let us do so.
[Str.] We shall find from our present point of view that the
greatest servants are in a case and condition which is the
reverse of what we anticipated.
[Y.Soc.] Who are they?
[Str.] Those who have been purchased, and have so become
possessions; these are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not
claim royal science.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly not.
[Str.] Again, freemen who of their own accord become the
servants of the other classes in a State, and who exchange and
equalise the products of husbandry and the other arts, some
sitting in the market-place, others going from city to city by
land or sea, and giving money in exchange for money or for other
productions-the money-changer, the merchant, the ship-owner, the
retailer, will not put in any claim to statecraft or politics?
[Y.Soc.] No; unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce.
[Str.] But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and
serfs, and too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not
profess to share in royal science?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly not.
[Str.] But what would you say of some other serviceable
officials?
[Y.Soc.] Who are they, and what services do they perform?
[Str.] There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice,
and divers others who have great skill in various sorts of
business connected with the government of states-what shall we
call them?
[Y.Soc.] They are the officials, and servants of the rulers,
as you just now called them, but not themselves rulers.
[Str.] There may be something strange in any servant
pretending to be a ruler, and yet I do not think that I could
have been dreaming when I imagined that the principal claimants
to political science would be found somewhere in this
neighbourhood.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of some
who have not yet been tested; in the first place, there are
diviners, who have a portion of servile or ministerial science,
and are thought to be the interpreters of the gods to men.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] There is also the priestly class, who, as the law
declares, know how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of
sacrifices which are acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf
blessings in return from them. Now both these are branches of the
servile or ministerial art.
[Y.Soc.] Yes, clearly.
[Str.] And here I think that we seem to be getting on the
right track; for the priest and the diviner are swollen with
pride and prerogative, and they create an awful impression of
themselves by the magnitude of their enterprises; in Egypt, the
king himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly
powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust
himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts
of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory
sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistracies, and here, at
Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices
are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by lot
to be the King Archon.
[Y.Soc.] Precisely.
[Str.] But who are these other kings and priests elected by
lot who now come into view followed by their retainers and a vast
throng, as the former class disappears and the scene changes?
[Y.Soc.] Whom can you mean?
[Str.] They are a strange crew.
[Y.Soc.] Why strange?
[Str.] A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every
tribe; for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many
more like satyrs and such weak and shifty creatures;-Protean
shapes quickly changing into one another's forms and natures; and
now, Socrates, I begin to see who they are.
[Y.Soc.] Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange
vision.
[Str.] Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him;
and just now I myself fell into this mistake-at first sight,
coming suddenly upon him, I did not recognize the politician and
his troop.
[Y.Soc.] Who is he?
[Str.] The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards,
who must at any cost be separated from the true king or
Statesman, if we are ever to see daylight in the present enquiry.
[Y.Soc.] That is a hope not lightly to be renounced.
[Str.] Never, if I can help it; and, first, let me ask you a
question.
[Y.Soc.] What?
[Str.] Is not monarchy a recognized form of government?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government
of the few?
[Y.Soc.] Of course.
[Str.] Is not the third form of government the rule of the
multitude, which is called by the name of democracy?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] And do not these three expand in a manner into five,
producing out of themselves two other names [Y.Soc.] What are
they?
[Y.Soc.] What are they?
[Str.] There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary,
poverty and riches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days
apply to them; the two first they subdivide accordingly, and
ascribe to monarchy two forms and two corresponding names,
royalty and tyranny.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] And the government of the few they distinguish by the
names of aristocracy and oligarchy.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws or
not, and whether the multitude rule over the men of property with
their consent or against their consent, always in ordinary
language has the same name.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] But do you suppose that any form of government which is
defined by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the
many, of poverty or wealth, of voluntary or compulsory
submission, of written law or the absence of law, can be a right
one?
[Y.Soc.] Why not?
[Str.] Reflect; and follow me.
[Y.Soc.] In what direction?
[Str.] Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we
retract our words?
[Y.Soc.] To what do you refer?
[Str.] If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a
science?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected
out of the rest as having a character which is at once judicial
and authoritative?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] And there was one kind of authority over lifeless
things and another other living animals; and so we proceeded in
the division step by step up to this point, not losing the idea
of science, but unable as yet to determine the nature of the
particular science?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing
principle of the State cannot be the few or many, the voluntary
or involuntary, poverty or riches; but some notion of science
must enter into it, if we are to be consistent with what has
preceded.
[Y.Soc.] And we must be consistent.
[Str.] Well, then, in which of these various forms of States
may the science of government, which is among the greatest of all
sciences and most difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside?
That we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false
politicians who pretend to be politicians but are not, although
they persuade many, and shall separate them from the wise king.
[Y.Soc.] That, as the argument has already intimated, will be
our duty.
[Str.] Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain
political science?
[Y.Soc.] Impossible.
[Str.] But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would
be a hundred, or say fifty, who could?
[Y.Soc.] In that case political science would certainly be the
easiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of
that number as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged
by the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly
not be as many kings. For kings we may truly call those who
possess royal science, whether they rule or not, as was shown in
the previous argument.
[Str.] Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that
any true form of government can only be supposed to be the
government of one, two, or, at any rate, of a few.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] And these, whether they rule with the will, or against
the will of their subjects, with written laws or. without written
laws, and whether they are poor or rich, and whatever be the
nature of their rule, must be supposed, according to our present
view, to rule on some scientific principle; just as the
physician, whether he cures us against our will or with our will,
and whatever be his mode of treatment-incision, burning, or the
infliction of some other pain-whether he practises out of a book
or not out of a book, and whether he be rich or poor, whether he
purges or reduces in some other way, or even fattens his
patients, is a physician all the same, so long as he exercises
authority over them according to rules of art, if he only does
them good and heals and saves them. And this we lay down to be
the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art
of command.
[Y.Soc.] Quite true.
[Str.] Then that can be the only true form of government in
which the governors are really found to possess science, and are
not mere pretenders, whether they rule according to law or
without law, over-willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or
poor themselves-none of these things can with any propriety be
included in the notion of the ruler.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And whether with a view to the public good they purge
the State by killing some, or exiling some; whether they reduce
the size of the body corporate by sending out from the hive
swarms of citizens, or, by introducing persons from without,
increase it; while they act according to the rules of wisdom and
justice, and use their power with a view to the general security
and improvement, the city over which they rule, and which has
these characteristics, may be described as the only true State.
All other governments are not genuine or real; but only
imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them
are worse; the better are said to be well governed, but they are
mere imitations like the others.
[Y.Soc.] I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you
say; but as to their ruling without laws-the expression has a
harsh sound.
[Str.] You have been too quick for me, Socrates; I was just
going to ask you whether you objected to any of my statements.
And now I see that we shall have to consider this notion of there
being good government without laws.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner
the business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that
the law should rule, but that a man should rule, supposing him to
have wisdom and royal power. Do you see why this is?
[Y.Soc.] Why?
[Str.] Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is
noblest and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what
is best. The differences of men and actions, and the endless
irregular movements of human things, do not admit of -any
universal and simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay down a
rule which will last for all time.
[Y.Soc.] Of course not.
[Str.] But the law is always striving to make one;-like an
obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be
done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked-not
even in sudden changes of circumstances, when something happens
to be better than what he commanded for some one.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the
manner which you describe.
[Str.] A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a
state of things which is the reverse of simple.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are
we compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to
be investigated.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic
contests in your city, such as there are in other cities, at
which men compete in running, wrestling, and the like?
[Y.Soc.] Yes; they are very common among us.
[Str.] And what are the rules which are enforced on their
pupils by professional trainers or by others having similar
authority? Can you remember?
[Y.Soc.] To what do you refer?
[Str.] The training-masters do not issue minute rules for
individuals, or give every individual what is exactly suited to
his constitution; they think that they ought to go more roughly
to work, and to prescribe generally the regimen, which will
benefit the majority.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to
them all; they send them forth together, and let them rest
together from their running, wrestling, or whatever the form of
bodily exercise may be.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And now observe that the legislator who has to preside
over the herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one
another, will not be able, in enacting for the general good, to
provide exactly what is suitable for each particular case.
[Y.Soc.] He cannot be expected to do so.
[Str.] He will lay down laws in a general form for the
majority, roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of
them he will deliver in writing, and others will be unwritten;
and these last will be traditional customs of the country.
[Y.Soc.] He will be right.
[Str.] Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man's
side all through his life, prescribing for him the exact
particulars of his duty? Who, Socrates, would be equal to such a
task? No one who really had the royal science, if he had been
able to do this, would have imposed upon himself the restriction
of a written law.
[Y.Soc.] So I should infer from what has now been said.
[Str.] Or rather, my good friend, from what is going to be
said.
[Y.Soc.] And what is that?
[Str.] Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or
trainer, who is about to go into a far country, and is expecting
to be a long time away from his patients-thinking that his
instructions will not be remembered unless they are written down,
he will leave notes of them for the use of his pupils or patients.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he
had intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or
other celestial influences, something else happened to be better
for them-would he not venture to suggest this new remedy,
although not contemplated in his former prescription? Would he
persist in observing the original law, neither himself giving any
few commandments, nor the patient daring to do otherwise than was
prescribed, under the idea that this course only was healthy and
medicinal, all others noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light
of science and true art, would not all such enactments be utterly
ridiculous?
[Y.Soc.] Utterly.
[Str.] And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten,
determining what was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable,
just or unjust, to the tribes of men who flock together in their
several cities, and are governed accordance with them; if, I say,
the wise legislator were suddenly to come again, or another like
to him, is he to be prohibited from changing them?-would not this
prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the other?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Do you know a plausible saying of the common people
which is in point?
[Y.Soc.] I do not recall what you mean at the moment.
[Str.] They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may
be improved, he must first persuade his own State of the
improvement, and then he may legislate, but not otherwise.
[Y.Soc.] And are they not right?
[Str.] I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle
violence for their good, what is this violence to be called? Or
rather, before you answer, let me ask the same question in
reference to our previous instances.
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of
whatever sex or age, whom he compels against his will to do
something for his good which is contrary to the written rules;
what is this compulsion to be called? Would you ever dream of
calling it a violation of the art, or a breach of the laws of
health? Nothing could be more unjust than for the patient to whom
such violence is applied, to charge the physician who practises
the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his disease.
[Y.Soc.] Most true.
[Str.] In the political art error is not called disease, but
evil, or disgrace, or injustice.
[Y.Soc.] Quite true.
[Str.] And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is
compelled to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did
before, the last and most absurd thing which he could say about
such violence is that he has incurred disgrace or evil or
injustice at the hands of those who compelled him.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a
rich man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May not any man,
rich or poor, with or without laws, with the will of the citizens
or against the will of the citizens, do what is for their
interest? Is not this the true principle of government, according
to which the wise and good man will order the affairs of his
subjects? As the pilot, by watching continually over the
interests of the ship and of the crew-not by laying down rules,
but by making his art a law-preserves the lives of his fellow-sailors,
even and in the self-same way, may there not be a true form of
polity created by those who are able to govern in a similar
spirit, and who show a strength of art which is superior to the
law? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they, observing the one
great rule of distributing justice to the citizens with
intelligence and skill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as
may be, to make them better from being worse.
[Y.Soc.] No one can deny what has been now said.
[Str.] Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other
statement.
[Y.Soc.] What was it?
[Str.] We said that no great number of persons, whoever they
may be, can attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely,
but that the true government is to be found in a small body, or
in an individual, and that other States are but imitations of
this, as we said a little while ago, some for the better and some
for the worse.
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean? I cannot have understood your
previous remark about imitations.
[Str.] And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out
is highly important, even if we leave the question where it is,
and do not seek by the discussion of it to expose the error which
prevails in this matter.
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or
familiar; but we may attempt to express it thus:-Supposing the
government of which I have been speaking to be the only true
model, then the others must use the written laws of this-in no
other can they be saved; they will have to do what is now
generally approved, although not the best thing in the world.
[Y.Soc.] What is this?
[Str.] No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and
any infringement of them should be punished with death and the
most extreme penalties; and this is very right and good when
regarded as the second best thing, if you set aside the first, of
which I was just now speaking. Shall I explain the nature of what
call the second best?
[Y.Soc.] By all means.
[Str.] I must again have recourse to my favourite images;
through them, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers.
[Y.Soc.] What images?
[Str.] The noble pilot and the wise physician, who "is
worth many another man"-in the similitude of these let us
endeavour to discover some image of the king.
[Y.Soc.] What sort of image?
[Str.] Well, such as this:-Every man will reflect that he
suffers strange things at the hands of both of them; the
physician; saves any whom he wishes to save, and any whom he
wishes to maltreat he maltreats-cutting or burning them; and at
the same time requiring them to bring him patients, which are a
sort of tribute, of which little or nothing is spent upon the
sick man, and the greater part is consumed by him and his
domestics; and the finale is that he receives money from the
relations of the sick man or from some enemy of his; and puts him
out of the way. And the pilots of ships are guilty, of numberless
evil deeds of the same kind; they intentionally play false and
leave you ashore when the hour of sailing arrives; or they cause
mishaps at sea and cast away their freight; and are guilty of
other rogueries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind,
were to determine, after consideration, that neither of these
arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control
either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon an
assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, that
anybody who likes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he
have no calling, may offer an opinion either about seamanship or
about diseases-whether as to the manner in which physic or
surgical instruments are to be applied to the patient, or again
about the vessels and the nautical implements which are required
in navigation, and how to meet the dangers of winds and waves
which are incidental to the voyage, how to behave when
encountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old
fashioned galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar
build-and that, whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on
these points, upon the advice of persons skilled or unskilled,
shall be written down on triangular tablets and columns, or
enacted although unwritten to be national customs; and that in
all future time vessels shall be navigated and remedies
administered to the patient after this fashion.
[Y.Soc.] What a strange notion!
[Str.] Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are
appointed annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole
people, and that they are elected by lot; and that after their
election they navigate vessels and heal the sick according to the
written rules.
[Y.Soc.] Worse and worse.
[Str.] But hear what follows:-When the year of office has
expired, the pilot or physician has to come before a court of
review, in which the judges are either selected from the wealthy
classes or chosen by lot out of the whole people; and anybody who
pleases may be their accuser, and may lay to their charge, that
during the past year they have not navigated their vessels or
healed their patients according to the letter of the law and the
ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of them is
condemned, some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or
pay.
[Y.Soc.] He who is willing to take a command under such
conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty.
[Str.] Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one
is detected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into
health and the true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or
other conditions of the atmosphere, contrary to the written
rules, and has any ingenious notions about such matters, he is
not to be called a pilot or physician, but a cloudy prating
sophist;-further, on the ground that he is a corrupter of the
young, who would persuade them. to follow the art of medicine or
piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule
over their patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may
inform against him, and indict him in some court, and then if he
is found to be persuading any, whether young or old, to act
contrary to the written law, he is to be punished with the utmost
rigour; for no one should presume to be wiser than the laws; and
as touching healing and health and piloting and navigation, the
nature of them is known to all, for anybody may learn the written
laws and the national customs. If such were the mode of
procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about generalship,
and any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation in
general, or carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry,
or planting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or
tending herds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or
draught-playing, or any science conversant with number, whether
simple or square or cube, or comprising motion-I say, if all
these things were done in this way according to written
regulations, and not according to art, what would be the result?
[Y.Soc.] All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be
recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life,
which is bad enough already, would then become utterly
unendurable.
[Str.] But what, if while compelling all these operations to
be regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian
of the laws some one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and
he caring nothing about the laws, were to act contrary to them
from motives of interest or favour, and without knowledge-would
not this be a still worse evil than the former?
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] To go against the laws, which are based upon long
experience, and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously
recommended them and persuaded the multitude to pass them, would
be a far greater and more ruinous error than any adherence to
written law?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best
thing in legislating is not to allow either the individual or the
multitude to break the law in any respect whatever.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] The laws would be copies of the true particulars of
action as far as they admit of being written down from the lips
of those who have knowledge?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly they would.
[Str.] And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a
true Statesman, will do many things within his own sphere of
action by his art without regard to the laws, when he is of
opinion that something other than that which he has written down
and enjoined to be observed during his absence would be better.
[Y.Soc.] Yes, we said so.
[Str.] And any individual or any number of men, having fixed
laws, in acting contrary to them with a view to something better,
would only be acting, as far as they are able, like the true
Statesman?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they
would imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but
if they had knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth,
and an imitation no longer.
[Y.Soc.] Quite true.
[Str.] And the principle that no great number of men are able
to acquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us.
[Y.Soc.] Yes, it has.
[Str.] Then the royal or political art, if there be such an
art, will never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other
mob.
[Y.Soc.] Impossible.
[Str.] Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of
government can ever make to the true government of the one
scientific ruler, is to do nothing contrary to their own written
laws and national customs.
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] When the rich imitate the true form, such a government
is called aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws,
oligarchy.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] Or again, when an individual rules according to law in
imitation of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules
according to law, we give him the same name, whether he rules
with opinion or with knowledge.
[Y.Soc.] To be sure.
[Str.] And when an individual truly possessing knowledge
rules, his name will surely be the same-he will be called a king;
and thus the five names of governments, as they are now reckoned,
become one.
[Y.Soc.] That is true.
[Str.] And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor
by custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science
pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws,
while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the
imitation, may not such an one be called a tyrant?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and
the king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies-because
men are offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to
believe that any one can be worthy of such authority, or is able
and willing in the spirit of virtue and knowledge to act justly
and holily to all; they fancy that he will be a despot who will
wrong and harm and slay whom he pleases of us; for if there could
be such a despot as we describe, they would acknowledge that we
ought to be too glad to have him, and that he alone would be the
happy ruler of a true and perfect State.
[Y.Soc.] To be sure.
[Str.] But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has
no natural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both
in body and in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws,
and endeavour to approach as nearly as they can to the true form
of government.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And when the foundation of politics is in the letter
only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we
wonder Socrates, at the miseries which there are, and always will
be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation and thus
conducted, would ruin all that it touched. Ought we not rather to
wonder at the natural strength of the political bond? For States
have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them
still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like
ships at sea, founder from time to time, and perish, and have
perished and will hire after perish, through the badness of their
pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the
highest truths-I mean to say, that they are wholly unaquainted
with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe
themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Then the question arises:-which of these untrue forms
of government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though
they are all oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is
a consideration which is beside our present purpose, and yet
having regard to the whole it seems to influence all our actions:
we must examine it.
[Y.Soc.] Yes, we must.
[Str.] You may say that of the three forms, the same is at
once the hardest and the easiest.
[Y.Soc.] What do you mean?
[Str.] I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I
mentioned at the beginning of this discussion-monarchy, the rule
of the few, and the rule of the many.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] If we divide each of these we shall have six, from
which the true one may be distinguished as a seventh.
[Y.Soc.] How would you make the division?
[Str.] Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of
the few into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and
oligarchy; and democracy or the rule of the many, which before
was one, must now be divided.
[Y.Soc.] On what principle of division?
[Str.] On the same principle as before, although the name is
now discovered to have a twofold meaning;-For the distinction of
ruling with law or without applies to this as well as to the rest.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] The division made no difference when we were looking
for the perfect State, as we showed before. But now that this has
been separated off, and, as we said, the others alone are left
for us, the principle of law and the absence of law will bisect
them all.
[Y.Soc.] That would seem follow, from what has been said.
[Str.] Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or
laws, is the best of all the six, and when lawless is the most
bitter and oppressive to the subject.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] The government of the few which is intermediate between
that of the one and many; is also intermediate in good and evil;
but the government of the many is in every respect weak and
unable to do either any great good or any great evil, when
compared with the others, because the offices are too minutely
subdivided and too many hold them. And this therefore is the
worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all lawless ones.
If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy is the
form in which to live is best; if they are well ordered then this
is the last which you should choose, as royalty, the first form,
is the best, with the exception of the seventh for that excels
them all, and is among States what God is among men.
[Y.Soc.] You are quite right, and we should choose that above
all.
[Str.] The members of all these States, with the exception of
the one which has knowledge may be set aside as being not
Statesmen but partisans-upholders of the most monstrous idols,
and themselves idols; and, being the greatest imitators and
magicians, they are also the greatest of Sophists.
[Y.Soc.] The name of Sophist after many windings in the
argument appears to have been most justly fixed upon the
politicians, as they are termed.
[Str.] And so our satyric drama has been played out; and the
troop of Centaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave the
stage, have at last been separated from the political science.
[Y.Soc.] So I perceive.
[Str.] There remain, however, natures still more troublesome,
because they are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult
to discern; the examination of them may be compared to the
process of refining gold.
[Y.Soc.] What is your meaning?
[Str.] The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones
and the like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable
clements akin to gold, which can only be separated by fire-copper,
silver, and other precious metals; these are at last refined away
by the use of tests, until the gold is left quite pure.
[Y.Soc.] Yes, that is the way in which these things are said
to be done.
[Str.] In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has
been separated from political science, and what is precious and
of a kindred nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts
of the general and the judge, and the higher sort of oratory
which is an ally of the royal art, and persuades men to do
justice, and assists in guiding the helm of States:-How can we
best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek alone and
unalloyed?
[Y.Soc.] That is obviously what has in some way to be
attempted.
[Str.] If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall
certainly be brought to light; and I think that the illustration
of music may assist in exhibiting him. Please to answer me a
question.
[Y.Soc.] What question?
[Str.] There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft
arts in general?
[Y.Soc.] There is.
[Str.] And is there any higher art or science, having power to
decide which of these arts are and are not to be learned;-what do
you say?
[Y.Soc.] I should answer that there is.
[Str.] And do we acknowledge this science to be different from
the others?
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or
no single science to any other? Or ought this science to be the
overseer and governor of all the others?
[Y.Soc.] The latter.
[Str.] You mean to say that the science which judges whether
we ought to learn or not, must be superior to the science which
is learned or which teaches?
[Y.Soc.] Far superior.
[Str.] And the science which determines whether we ought to
persuade or not, must be superior to the science which is able to
persuade?
[Y.Soc.] Of course.
[Str.] Very good; and to what science do we assign the power
of persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?
[Y.Soc.] That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to
rhetoric.
[Str.] And to what science do we give the power of determining
whether we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or
to refrain altogether?
[Y.Soc.] To that science which governs the arts of speech and
persuasion.
[Str.] Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from
politics, being a different species, yet ministering to it.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] But what would you think of another sort of power or
science?
[Y.Soc.] What science?
[Str.] The science which has to do with military operations
against our enemies-is that to be regarded as a science or not?
[Y.Soc.] How can generalship and military tactics be regarded
as other than a science?
[Str.] And is the art which is able and knows how to advise
when we are to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or
different?
[Y.Soc.] If we are to be consistent, we must say different.
[Str.] And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if
we are not to give up our former notion?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And, considering how great and terrible the whole art
of war is, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the
truly royal?
[Y.Soc.] No other.
[Str.] The art of the general is only ministerial, and
therefore not political?
[Y.Soc.] Exactly.
[Str.] Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous
judge.
[Y.Soc.] Very good.
[Str.] Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with
one another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard
which he receives from the king and legislator-showing his own
peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts,
or fears, or pity, or by any sort of favour or enmity, into
deciding the suits of men with one another contrary to the
appointment of the legislator?
[Y.Soc.] No; his office is such as you describe.
[Str.] Then the inference is that the power of the judge is
not royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which
ministers to the royal power?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] The review of all these sciences shows that none of
them is political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself
to act, but to rule over those who are able to act; the king
ought to know what is and what is not a fitting opportunity for
taking the initiative in matters of the greatest importance,
whilst others, should execute his orders.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as
they have no authority over themselves or one another, but are
each of them concerned with some special action of their own,
have, as they ought to have, special names corresponding to their
several actions.
[Y.Soc.] I agree.
[Str.] And the science which is over them all, and has charge
of the laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly
weaves them all into one, if we would describe under a name
characteristic of their common nature, most truly we may call
politics.
[Y.Soc.] Exactly so.
[Str.] Then, now that we have discovered the various classes
in a State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which
weaving supplied?
[Y.Soc.] I greatly wish that you would.
[Str.] Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and
show how the various threads are woven into one piece.
[Y.Soc.] Clearly.
[Str.] A task has to be accomplished, which although
difficult, appears to be necessary.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly the attempt must be made.
[Str.] To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from
another, is a position easily assailable by contentious
disputants, who appeal to popular opinion.
[Y.Soc.] I do not understand.
[Str.] Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that
you would consider courage to be a part of virtue?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly I should.
[Str.] And you would think temperance to be different from
courage; and likewise to be a part of virtue?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about
them.
[Y.Soc.] What is it?
[Str.] That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one
another and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature.
[Y.Soc.] How singular!
[Str.] Yes very-for all the parts of virtue are commonly said
to be friendly to one another.
[Y.Soc.] Yes.
[Str.] Then let us carefully investigate whether this is
universally true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which
are at war with their kindred in some respect.
[Y.Soc.] Tell me how we shall consider that question.
[Str.] We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we
consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite
classes.
[Y.Soc.] Explain; what are they?
[Str.] Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in
the movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting
and music supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or
been present when others praised them.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] And do you remember the terms in which they are
praised?
[Y.Soc.] I do not.
[Str.] I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the
thought which is passing in my mind.
[Y.Soc.] Why not?
[Str.] You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us
consider these notions with reference to the opposite classes of
action under which they fall. When we praise quickness and energy
and acuteness, whether of mind or body or sound, we express our
praise of the quality which we admire by one word, and that one
word is manliness or courage.
[Y.Soc.] How?
[Str.] We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and
manly, and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I
speak as the common attribute of all these natures, we certainly
praise them.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action
also?
[Y.Soc.] To be sure.
[Str.] And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of
the other?
[Y.Soc.] How do you mean?
[Str.] We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of
the slow and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness
and gentleness in action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and
of all rhythmical movement and of music in general, when these
have a proper solemnity. Of all such actions we predicate not
courage, but a name indicative of order.
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of
place, the names of either are changed into terms of censure.
[Y.Soc.] How so?
[Str.] Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed
violence or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called
cowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most
part these qualities, and the temperance and manliness of the
opposite characters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides,
and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions;
and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that men who have
these different qualities of mind differ from one another.
[Y.Soc.] In what respect?
[Str.] In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and
very likely of many others. According to their respective
affinities to either class of actions they distribute praise and
blame-praise to the actions which are akin to their own, blame to
those of the opposite party-and out of this many quarrels and
occasions of quarrel arise among them.
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] The difference between the two classes is often a
trivial concern; but in a state, and when affecting really
important matters, becomes of all disorders the most hateful.
[Y.Soc.] To what do you refer?
[Str.] To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life.
For the orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life,
quietly doing their own business; this is their manner of
behaving with all men at home, and they are equally ready to find
some way of keeping the peace with foreign States. And on account
of this fondness of theirs for peace, which is often out of
season where their influence prevails, they become by degrees
unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like themselves;
they are at the mercy of their enemies; whence in a few years
they and their children and the whole city often pass
imperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves.
[Y.Soc.] What a cruel fate!
[Str.] And now think of what happens with the more courageous
natures. Are they not always inciting their country to go to war,
owing to their excessive love of the military life? they raise up
enemies against themselves many and mighty, and either utterly
ruin their native land or enslave and subject it to its foes?
[Y.Soc.] That, again, is true.
[Str.] Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes
exist. they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism
towards one another?
[Y.Soc.] We cannot deny it.
[Str.] And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have
we not found that considerable portions of virtue are at variance
with one another, and give rise to a similar opposition in the
characters who are endowed with them?
[Y.Soc.] True.
[Str.] Let us consider a further point.
[Y.Soc.] What is it?
[Str.] I want to know, whether any constructive art will make
any, even the most trivial thing, out of bad and good materials
indifferently, if this can be helped? does not all art rather
reject the bad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit
materials, and from these elements, whether like or unlike,
gathering them all into one, work out some nature or idea?
[Y.Soc.] To, be sure.
[Str.] Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will
never allow any State to be formed by a combination of good and
bad men, if this can be avoided; but will begin by testing human
natures in play, and after testing them, will entrust them to
proper teachers who are the ministers of her purposes-she will
herself give orders, and maintain authority; just as the art of
weaving continually gives orders and maintains authority over the
carders and all the others who prepare the material for the work,
commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the works which she
deems necessary for making the web.
[Y.Soc.] Quite true.
[Str.] In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be
the mistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having
this queenly power, will not permit them to train men in what
will produce characters unsuited to the political constitution
which she desires to create, but only in what will produce such
as are suitable. Those which have no share of manliness and
temperance, or any other virtuous inclination, and, from the
necessity of an evil nature, are violently carried away to
godlessness and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of by death
and exile, and punishes them with the greatest of disgraces.
[Y.Soc.] That is commonly said.
[Str.] But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness
she bows under the yoke of slavery.
[Y.Soc.] Quite right.
[Str.] The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have
education, something noble may be made, and who are capable of
being united by the Statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves
together; taking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather
to courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as
the warp, and on the other hand those which incline to order and
gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as spun thick
and soft after the manner of the woof-these, which are naturally
opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the following
manner:
[Y.Soc.] In what manner?
[Str.] First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul
and binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then
the animal nature, and binds that with human cords.
[Y.Soc.] I do not understand what you mean.
[Str.] The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable
and the just and good and their opposites, which is true and
confirmed by reason, is a divine principle, and when implanted in
the soul, is implanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly
birth.
[Y.Soc.] Yes; what else should it be?
[Str.] Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the
inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he,
only in the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing.
[Y.Soc.] Likely enough.
[Str.] But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the
names which are the subject of the present which are the subject
of the present enquiry.
[Y.Soc.] Very right.
[Str.] The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes
civilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but
when not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true?
[Y.Soc.] Certainly.
[Str.] And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing
in these opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may
be in a State, but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious
name of silliness.
[Y.Soc.] Quite true.
[Str.] Can we say that such a connection as this will
lastingly unite the evil with one another or with the good, or
that any science would seriously think of using a bond of this
kind to join such materials?
[Y.Soc.] Impossible.
[Str.] But in those who were originally of a noble nature, and
who have been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we
not say that union is implanted by law, and that this is the
medicine which art prescribes for them, and of all the bonds
which unite the dissimilar and contrary parts of virtue is not
this, as I was saying, the divinest?
[Y.Soc.] Very true.
[Str.] Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in
imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other
bonds, which are human only.
[Y.Soc.] How is that, and what bonds do you mean?
[Str.] Rights of intermarriage, and ties which are formed
between States by giving and taking children in marriage, or
between individuals by private betrothals and espousals. For most
persons form; marriage connection without due regard to what is
best for the procreation of children.
[Y.Soc.] In what way?
[Str.] They seek after wealth and power, which, in matrimony
are objects not worthy-even of a serious censure.
[Y.Soc.] There is no need to consider them at all.
[Str.] More reason is-there to consider the practice of those
who make family their chief aim, and to indicate their error.
[Y.Soc.] Quite true.
[Str.] They act on no true principle at all; they seek their
ease and receive with open arms those are like themselves, and
hate those who are unlike them, being too much influenced by
feelings of dislike.
[Y.Soc.] How so?
[Str.] The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their
own, and as far as they can they marry and give in marriage
exclusively in this class, and the courageous do the same; they
seek natures like their own, whereas they should both do
precisely the opposite.
[Y.Soc.] How and why is that?
[Str.] Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature
during many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but
at last bursts forth into downright madness.
[Y.Soc.] Like enough.
[Str.] And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty
and has no element of courage in many successive generations, is
apt to grow too indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed
and useless.
[Y.Soc.] That, again, is quite likely.
[Str.] It was of these bonds I said that there would be no
difficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held
the same opinion about the honourable and good;-indeed, in this
single work, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised-never
to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to
weave them together, like the warp and the woof, by common
sentiments and honours and reputation, and by the giving of
pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and
even web, to entrust to them the offices of State.
[Y.Soc.] How do you mean?
[Str.] Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a
ruler who has both these qualities-when many, you must mingle
some of each, for the temperate ruler is very careful and just
and safe, but is wanting in thoroughness and go.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly, that is very true.
[Str.] The character of the courageous, on the other hand,
falls short of the former in justice and caution, but has the
power of action in a remarkable degree, and where either of these
two qualities is wanting, there cities. cannot altogether prosper
either in their public or private life.
[Y.Soc.] Certainly they cannot.
[Str.] This then we declare to be the completion of the web of
political Action, which is created by a direct intertexture of
the brave and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has
drawn the two minds into communion with one another by unanimity
and friendship, and having perfected the noblest and best of all
the webs which political life admits, and enfolding therein all
other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds
them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, and, in so
far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no particular
fails to secure their happiness.
[Y.Soc.] Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no
less than of the Sophist, is quite perfect.
-THE END-
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